The
National Association of Railroad Passengers (NARP) urges Congress and the U. S.
Department of Transportation to take the following actions in response to
Amtrak’s report on resuming passenger train service over the route segment between
1.
Implement
Option #1 – restore the tri-weekly service between
2.
Implement
Option #2 – daily service by extending the City of
3.
Coordinate
the implementation of Option #2 with the implementation of its plan for daily
service between
4.
Incorporate
the capital costs of the Gulf Coast Connector for such long-term projects as
station improvements,
5. Release for public review and comment the assumptions, methodology and data used to project volume, revenue, operating and capital costs.
Justification
·
The
Gulf Coast Connector between
·
The
Connector is the only part of Amtrak’s national system that is not operating
even though it appeared on the map that President Obama used when he unveiled
his Vision for High-Speed Rail in America
on April 16.[iii] Part
of the line was destroyed by Hurricane Katrina in 2005. CSX restored and upgraded the damaged sections
within six months. Amtrak, however,
never restarted service. The huge human
and economic costs Katrina imposed along the
·
During
the administration of President George H. W. Bush, the Federal Railroad
Administration (under Administrator Gilbert E. Carmichael) and Amtrak (then led
by President W. Graham Claytor Jr.) issued a report on March 6, 1991, Potential Jacksonville-New Orleans Service
Options, which stated at page 1, “The Jacksonville-New Orleans route has
often been referred to as the ‘missing link’ in the Amtrak system because, if
operated, it would join the sunbelt cities of Los Angeles, Phoenix, Tucson, El
Paso, and Houston with major Florida markets through New Orleans. These areas contain some of the fastest
growing population centers in the
·
In
addition to linking major population centers west of
·
A
large market exists for passenger train service that traverses The Gulf Coast
Connector.
Table 1
Annual Person Round Trips To, From and Within State
|
|
126,809,974 |
|
|
99,471,208 |
|
|
77,987,712 |
·
Of
the total trips, almost one third are
Table 2
Annual
|
|
35,059,970 |
|
|
25,170,272 |
|
|
24,823,589 |
|
|
24,443,231 |
·
Table 3
Population by State 2008
|
36,756,666 |
|
|
|
24,326,974 |
|
|
19,490,297 |
|
|
18,328,340 |
·
·
Because
of the long distances involved and motor vehicles’ dominant share of the travel
market to and from
Ø The majority of trips to and from
other states (54%) are by motor vehicle even though three fourths of all trips
involve very long one-way distances of 500 to 1,000 miles or more. The share for air travel is 10 points lower
(44%). [viii]
Ø The high share for motor vehicles undoubtedly
reflects the fact that personal travel represents 80% of the
Ø Because of the long distances
involved, overnight train service is especially attractive and competitive
compared to motor vehicles, which typically involve overnight stays and
frequent stops.
Ø The train’s advantage over road and air will increase with the long term increase most experts predict in oil prices.
·
The
Gulf Coast Connector serves two of the three primary markets between
Ø 10% are from states west of New
Orleans that were served by the Florida-California route, which Amtrak severed by
suspending service east of New Orleans in 2005.
Ø 37% are from 16 Midwestern and Southern
states that would be served by a Chicago-New Orleans-Florida service.
Ø 50% are from 17 states (and the
· NARP believes that “phased implementation” – starting with Option #1 and moving to Option #2 – represents the most feasible way to resume service quickly while providing Amtrak with the lead times it says it needs to obtain the staff and equipment necessary for daily service.
· The increased revenue that the Gulf Coast Connector could generate for Amtrak is significant and far greater, we believe, than Amtrak estimates.
Ø Before on time performance
deteriorated and track work caused service frequency to be reduced from three
to two weekly round-trips, travelers going east of
Ø Instituting through service north to
Ø Daily service has the potential to double revenue on each leg (west and north), bringing the total additional revenue that the “Gulf Coast Connector” could generate to as much as $40 to $50 million a year.
Short Critique of Amtrak’s Report
We are concerned that Amtrak’s report reflects a negative attitude about this service:
·
Cites
declining ridership in the period prior to service suspension but fails to
mention that CSX track maintenance forced cancellation of as many as one out of
every three scheduled trips for months. Ridership
declines reflected reduced service far more than any decline in demand. On time performance was poor, as Amtrak’s
report notes at page 11. However, the
reliability of other Amtrak trains on CSX has improved dramatically since 2005,
as the report notes (less conspicuously) at page 31.
·
Makes
pessimistic estimates of volume and revenue but fails to articulate any
justification for these projections – much less any explanation of the
assumptions, data and methodology used – thus making impossible an independent
assessment of the accuracy and reasonableness of the estimates.
·
Claims
the train is not time competitive with the automobile because the train will
average only 41 mph while a car can average 67 mph but ignores the fact that
the actual average speed of a car will be far lower because a 650-mile car trip
for most people requires down time for sleeping, eating, fueling and rest stops.
It also ignores the fact that the train
makes a significant portion of its trip at night when most motorists would be
sleeping, and that people traveling longer distances are less time sensitive.
· Exaggerates start up costs by implying that all previous stations would initially be served.
Also, the law required Amtrak to seek input, but – as reflected in the appendices to
their report – did so only with rail labor. The standard outreach letter – including the
one to the National Association of Railroad Passengers – concluded, “I hope
this information is helpful in your evaluation of the possibilities for
restoring service east of
Conclusion
For
decades, the federal government correctly has funded the mobility needs of
Americans in the Northeast. The
Northeast Corridor (NEC) is an interstate route, connecting eight states and
the
As a
result of this difference in approach, Amtrak has not only failed to respond to
the needs and opportunities of the large and growing
While individual states can supplement a federally funded national system (just as states supplement service in the Northeast), they cannot create and operate the effective interstate system that American mobility requires. That is why interstate commerce – and transportation – is a federal, not a state responsibility.
The time has come for Congress and the Administration to push and fund Amtrak to expand service by applying nationally the funding model that has been successfully used for the NEC. The 85% of Americans living outside the NEC service area want and need modern, reliable passenger train service. Restoring the Gulf Coast Connector should be a first step.
The tone of the report on restoring Gulf Coast Connector service suggests that Amtrak explores service expansion grudgingly and without enthusiasm—perhaps because they are cautious about embarking on what they fear might become an unfunded mandate. The National Association of Railroad Passengers is very concerned that without firm direction and funding from Congress and the Administration, Amtrak will do nothing. Therefore, we respectfully request that Congress and the Secretary of Transportation adopt the five recommendations outlined at the beginning of this paper.
[i] P.R.I.I.A. Section 226 Gulf Coast Service Plan Report at www.amtrak.com/pdf/PRIAA/GulfCoastServicePlanReport.pdf
[ii]
Population growth 1970 to
2000:
[iii] http://www.fra.dot.gov/Downloads/Final%20FRA%20HSR%20Strat%20Plan.pdf (figure 6 on page 7).
[iv] Statistics for travel within and between each of the 50 states drawn from an Origin & Destination trip matrix provided by Bureau of Transportation Statistics, American Travel Survey, 1995.
[v] Ibid.
[vi] Population growth 2000 to 2008 by state: http://factfinder.census.gov/servlet/GCTTable?_bm=y&-geo_id=01000US&-_box_head_nbr=GCT-T1-R&-ds_name=PEP_2008_EST&-format=US-40S
[vii] Ibid.
[viii]
Distance and principle means
of transportation to, from and within
[ix] Ibid.
[x] BTS O&D matrix (note #3).
[xi] Amtrak, FY01 City Pair Data by Route and Class.