The National Association of Railroad Passengers shares the commonly held view that David L. Gunn as Amtrak president and CEO is doing an excellent job. We believe the increased credibility that Amtrak seems to enjoy in many quarters is well deserved, but we recognize the challenges that lie ahead in terms of the need for adequate funding both for Amtrak and for a corridor development program.
Corridor Development
The National Association of Railroad Passengers agrees that there is a crying need for increased short-distance corridor development. Indeed, much of the corridor development that has taken place thus far is the result of efforts by our members -- with our support -- to secure and maintain the requisite state funding. Today, states are playing a more active role than ever before. Federal policy should be designed to encourage states to continue those efforts. Shifting virtually all costs to the states would risk losing ground already gained.
To cite two specific efforts in which our members played important roles, the much-vaunted California program grew out of a citizen initiative (Proposition 116) that in 1990 provided the state department of transportation with $2 billion for passenger rail. The hard work was done by the Planning and Conservation League and by Train Riders Association of California. Similarly, our members and the Washington Association of Railroad Passengers played a key role in the pro-rail swing in State of Washington policies a few years later that has led to the Cascades success.
While we all would like to have seen more progress by now, the fact remains that considerable progress has been accomplished, as reflected in the table below. It is also worth noting that the much-maligned recent Northeast Corridor investments nonetheless have led to a doubling in Amtrak’s share of the Boston-New York rail-plus-air market (from 18% in July-December, 1999, to 36% in January-March, 2003; during the same period the comparable New York-Washington figure rose from 36% to 53%).
Table One. Corridor Ridership (mill.), FY 1993 and FY 2003
|
|
|
|
|
| Metroliner/
Acela Express |
1.980
|
2.937
|
+ 48%
|
| NortheastDirect/Regional |
5.970
|
5.975
|
+ 0%
|
| Downeaster
(Boston-Portland, Me.) |
0.000
|
0.254
|
--
|
| Empire Corridor
(N.Y. State) |
1.079
|
1.024
|
- 5%
|
| Keystone
(Harrisburg line) |
0.318
|
0.886
|
+179%
|
| Chicago-Detroit |
0.391
|
0.326
|
- 17%
|
| Chicago-Milwaukee |
0.412
|
0.417
|
+ 1%
|
| Chicago-St. Louis |
0.307
|
0.255
|
- 17%
|
| Cascades
(Pacific N.W.) |
0.094
|
0.590
|
+528%
|
| Capitols
(Sacramento-Bay Area) |
0.278
|
1.139
|
+310%
|
| San Joaquins |
0.532
|
0.783
|
+ 47%
|
| San Diegans/
Pacific Surfliners |
1.778
|
2.179
|
+ 23%
|
| Total of Selected Corridors |
13.139
|
16.765
|
+ 28%
|
| System total |
22.066
|
23.782
|
+ 8%
|
| Corridor as % of total |
59%
|
70%
|
FY03 ridership on the St. Louis, Detroit and Milwaukee lines were up, respectively, 13%, 9% and 3% from FY02. The last two work seasons have seen considerable track and signal improvements on the St. Louis line. Illinois funded the track work. Signal work was jointly funded by Federal Railroad Administration, Association of American Railroads, and the state. In addition, FRA-funded signal work on the one-third of the Detroit line that Amtrak owns has permitted top speeds to rise from 79 mph to 90 mph; they are expected to reach 110 mph within a few years.
This progress has been achieved within the context of existing law and organizational structures. It is easy to wish that a different structure could produce better results going forward, but any change must be evaluated carefully.
The Bush Administration's proposal to eliminate Amtrak's "right of access" to freight railroad tracks for new routes, and for new frequencies on existing routes, could make it difficult for states that already are "fiscally challenged" to add new service. The managing director of the Capitol Corridor (California) has said that his track charges might triple without the right of access law.
The freight railroads already have the well-established ability to condition new services on appropriate infrastructure investment; this is not something that requires a change in the law.
We do not have a principled stand against having another operator provide the service, but we are concerned about the amount of energy that could be wasted in pursuing this option, given the firmly established positions of the freight railroads and rail labor. Moreover, Economist Max B. Sawicky notes: "You don't save money or get competition just by virtue of using private vendors. Private vendors need profit margins. Thin markets can mean few bidders. And vendors can open with lowball bids, then -- after they've won -- raise costs over time."
Obviously, it is important that Amtrak maintain the new confidence in its accounting and its overall processes which, as noted above, we have seen under David Gunn.
Long-distance Trains
Eliminating long-distance trains will not provide anywhere near the funds needed to establish new short-distance services. On the contrary, the result of such elimination might be a loss of Congressional interest in funding intercity passenger rail in general.
It is commonly stated that only a small portion of passengers ride the entire length of most long-distance runs (except, of course, Auto Train, which has no intermediate stops). That observation should not cause people to overlook the very long average trip lengths on these trains.
Table Two. Trip/Route lengths for certain long-distance routes
|
|
|
|
|
| California Zephyr |
2,438
|
870
|
|
| Capitol Limited |
764
|
510
|
|
| Crescent |
1,377
|
585
|
|
| Empire Builder* |
2,206
|
825
|
|
| Silver Meteor |
1,389
|
698
|
|
| Southwest Chief |
2,256
|
1,140
|
|
| Three Rivers |
908
|
561
|
|
* Empire Builder mileage shown is for Seattle section. Chicago-Portland mileage is 2,257.
All of the average trip lengths shown exceed the length of short-distance corridors as commonly defined, and these figures understate the actual length of many trips since 30 to 50 per cent of long-distance passengers connect with other routes.
Any attempt to "chop up" these routes into smaller, daytime pieces will quickly run afoul of the high costs of establishing new terminals for crews and equipment and the considerable loss of existing business and revenue that would result because people will not accept forced transfers and overnight layovers. For example, one attraction of the Empire Builder for travelers from points west is that it arrives in the Twin Cities in the early morning and departs in the evening, enabling people to minimize their time away from their job, as well as their hotel costs -- one full day in Twin Cities with no hotel expense, two full days with only one hotel night, etc.
Thank you for considering our views.