» Comments on Amtrak Pioneer Route Study Report

Comments of the National Association of Railroad Passengers, Ross B. Capon, President and CEO to Amtrak on Draft “ Pioneer Route Study Report”

We appreciate the opportunity to comment, albeit on one week’s notice. We also appreciate the efforts of Senators Ron Wyden (D-OR) and Michael D. Crapo (R-ID) to restore the Pioneer. Senator Wyden aptly calls it “a passenger rail line that should never have been closed in the first place,” harking back to Senate testimony by then Amtrak Chairman Tommy Thompson supporting that contention.

Our top-line concerns are these:

• Revenue estimates appear low and the methodology behind these estimates is not explained, in contrast with the great detail given to capital costs.
 
• Similarly, the estimated revenue-to-cost ratios appear low and may not have been calculated appropriately for a train that combines with another train.
• We recommend study of two additional options: Seattle to Los Angeles via Eastern Oregon, Boise, Salt Lake City and Las Vegas; Denver to Portland as suggested by Cascadia (although we have concerns about some of the statements in the report).

Ridership estimates too low and too opaque: We heartily endorse Senator Michael D. Crapo’s (R-ID) request, in his September 30 letter to Amtrak President Joseph Boardman, for “a written response explaining the ridership modeling and the assumptions used to obtain the estimates in the study.”

As Amtrak well knows, the environment for train travel has improved markedly in recent years. Even during the current, difficult economic times, the overnight trains as a group have seen ridership and revenues hold up better than either the Northeast Corridor or other state corridors. For the 11 months of Fiscal 2009 (Oct-August), Northeast Corridor revenues were down 9%, state corridors 4% and overnight trains 3%. The California Zephyr actually posted a 3% revenue increase.

To illustrate that Amtrak’s Pioneer projections appear to ignore the strengthening of the overnight train market since the Pioneer last operated, consider that ridership on the Southwest Chief in Fiscal 2007 and 2008, respectively, was 34% and 40% higher than in Fiscal 1996, the last full year the Pioneer operated. The comparable percentage changes for passenger revenues were astounding: 58% and 71%, respectively, which doubtless reflects ridership constrained by limited capacity.

In addition to the general trends in overnight train revenues, three other factors argue for higher ridership estimates.

• One is openly acknowledged in the report: non-rail alternatives along the Pioneer route are considerably weaker than 10-15 years ago. [Page 62 of the report: “Restoration of the Pioneer would play a particularly important role in the 12 communities along the route that lack convenient access to air service and have only limited intercity bus service ... Airline service in [the smaller communities along the Pioneer route] is much less convenient and much more expensive than it was when the Pioneer operated. ... Current Greyhound Lines schedules (June 2009) show just two daily round trip frequencies along most of the Pioneer’s route, and one-seat bus service is no longer available from Seattle to Boise, Salt Lake City and Denver.”]
• As noted on page 63, however, development and expansion of commuter and light rail services in the Denver and Salt Lake City areas means that trains have become familiar to more people in key Pioneer markets, which also could boost interest in a restored Pioneer. In addition, opportunities to coordinate with tour and transit bus companies should be considered.
• As Senator Crapo’s letter notes, “The study projects the ridership at a level nearly 30% below the historic high in 1992 while the population growth in the states along the route has increased by 41%.”

NARP provided relevant market data to Amtrak in April, but it does not appear that this was given credit in preparation of the report.

Through cars to/from Chicago: Unless the above-referenced Los Angeles routing is chosen, we agree that through cars to/from Chicago/Omaha would be important and produce significant revenue. Amtrak responded to this reality early in the Pioneer’s existence when the free-standing Salt Lake City-Seattle train was replaced with what was in effect a section of the San Francisco Zephyr (later, California Zephyr, page 2). This made the combined Zephyr/Pioneer essentially a single train, best calculated with a single revenue-to-cost ratio for the entire operation. It is logical, of course, to understand the impact of adding Pioneer but the only accurate way to get that is by comparing the revenue-to-cost ratio—and other performance measures—of the existing operation (California Zephyr alone) with that of the proposed Zephyr/Pioneer operation.

Amtrak appears to have tried only to identify economic measures for the Pioneer as a stand-alone service. This analytical approach is guaranteed to give a distorted, negative picture of the prospective service.

“[T]he California Zephyr connection is critical to the operation of the Pioneer, since a large portion of the projected revenue is generated by passengers whose trip includes travel on the California Zephyr east of Denver/Salt Lake City” [draft report, p. 41]. The report, however, is silent on benefits Pioneer would confer on the Zephyr. For example, Pioneer cars will add capacity to the Zephyr over the segment where the trains are combined, and some of this capacity will be used by passengers local to Zephyr markets. That is, even if the through-cars sell out on the Pioneer segment (that is, west of Denver or Salt Lake City), only a small share of those passengers will travel to or from Chicago, leaving opportunities to sell the space to Chicago-Denver, Omaha-Galesburg, etc. passengers. In other words, the train the public recognizes as the Zephyr will have more capacity, handle more passengers and earn more revenues in markets the Zephyr serves today. Service-recovery opportunities will be greater as the bigger train means more useful redundancy if a car should develop a problem.

(In the long run, it would be ideal to run Pioneer as a separate train all the way to/from Chicago. This would permit a more attractive eastbound departure from Seattle and avoid a very long layover in Salt Lake City.)

Seattle crucial: We believe through service to Seattle is vital; it is not included in options 3 and 4.

Infrastructure costs: It should be obvious that UP’s infrastructure numbers are the opening bid in a negotiating process. Indeed, the report refers at page 52 to “further analyses and negotiations.” We urge Amtrak to point this out wherever possible so that these numbers do not needlessly discourage support for restoration.

Station costs generally should be borne by the communities served, although it would be good—if Amtrak gets a RIF loan for ADA work—to include ADA-specific work for stations on routes like the Pioneer. Careful reviews are needed for claims that station stops should vary from ones served in 1997.

Los Angeles option: When the Pioneer was discontinued, Amtrak also dropped service on a second branch of the Zephyr, the Chicago-Salt Lake City-Las Vegas-Los Angeles Desert Wind. An Amtrak executive told our chairman at the time that this was the strongest of the routes dropped. Bureau of Transportation Statistics data suggest a strong travel market between Idaho/Utah and California/Nevada. A Seattle-Idaho-Los Angeles train would serve this market.

Denver-Wyoming-Salt Lake City-Seattle: We think the Cascadia Center has done enough homework to warrant a serious look at their proposed schedule, which involves two nights and one day. We agree that downtown Cheyenne should be served if any “Denver option” is chosen. However, we are concerned about some of the comments in their report, as well as issues they do not mention:

1. Their reference to “private operation of passenger trains” cites Sections 214, 216 and 217 of the Passenger Rail Investment and Improvement Act. In fact, the only private operator contemplated in Section 214 is the railroad that owns the tracks; we are not aware of Union Pacific interest in operating a Pioneer service. Section 216 refers only to “special trains.” Section 217 refers to state-funded trains.
2. The claim that “trains compete meaningfully with airplanes only in short travel lanes” may be technically correct but in this context is misleading. While riding overnight trains, I have talked to many fellow passengers who had checked air fares before traveling.
3. Making an Ogden-Salt Lake City round-trip of course adds time to trips that transit this area, but would serve a large metro market, increase the public usefulness of the service and generate significant incremental revenue.
4. Having no through cars to and from Chicago sacrifices a significant amount of revenue, though just how much is impossible to determine from the report’s sketchy data.
5. Low cost per train-mile is not conclusive evidence that an option is best.
6. Introduction of single-level cars into territory exclusively used by Superliners (and Talgo) creates cost and perhaps logistical issues.
7. We do not agree that “Viewliners [single-level cars] would be available relatively soon” to run this service or that $100 million or more could be saved by use of existing rolling stock and refurbished cars. We would like to see a national equipment fleet large enough to run the entire national system plus additional routes, including Pioneer, but that fleet does not exist today.

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