|
||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
» Comments on the National Rail PlanBEFORE THE FEDERAL RAILROAD ADMINISTRATION DOCKET NO. FRA—2010—0020 COMMENTS OF THE NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF RAILROAD PASSENGERS
1. The Vision, and a Map The Association believes that the plan should include an aggressive, illustrative map suggesting routes where intercity passenger service should be added and where world-class high speed rail services should be implemented. We encourage review of the similar map at printed page 27 of the Report of the National Surface Transportation Policy and Revenue Study Commission: Transportation for Tomorrow (published December 27, 2007). This map initially appeared at printed page 35 of the report of the Commission’s Passenger Rail Working Group, on which I served. That report, Vision for the future: U.S. intercity passenger rail network through 2050, was issued December 6, 2007, and also includes maps for 2015 and 2030 (printed pages 33 and 34, respectively) illustrating how the lines might be phased in. Our own 40-year vision is at http://www.narprail.org/vision and, as one might expect, it is more aggressive than the Commission’s. However, it is actually less aggressive than North Carolina DOT”s rail passenger plan for that state. We believe the reach of the intercity passenger train network should be significantly expanded, both in terms of geographical reach as well as higher speeds and more frequent service. To the Commission’s 2050 map, for example, we would certainly add the route across southern Montana and North Dakota that Amtrak recently studied under statutory mandate. We also emphasize the importance of linking Atlanta to Florida before 2030 and linking Chicago to Atlanta well before 2050.
2. Importance of Higher Speed Rail The National Rail Plan must play an important, educational role in convincing the public and opinion leaders of the value of incremental improvements such as California and other states have demonstrated over the past few decades. There is a need to combat rhetoric and discussion which implies that the failure to develop multiple “bullet train” routes within the next few years means the U.S. rail program has failed. Overseas, it is often the case that ‘true’ high speed rail is introduced after—and as a result of—the saturation of conventional lines, which also connect high-speed lines to areas they do not serve directly. High-speed and conventional passenger services—as well as local public transit—work hand-in-hand to feed each other with riders and provide seamless mobility for the entire population. In the U.S., the public has repeatedly shown a willingness to patronize modern trains at conventional speeds, particularly where the service is frequent and there are attractive stations and intermodal connections (including dedicated buses as in California). The fiscal realities facing many states, and the applications already received at FRA, suggest that for the near term “true” high speed rail projects will be the exception rather than the rule. The Plan must make clear that this can be good, if the higher speed projects are well executed. Ridership on the three California corridors today accounts for roughly 20% of all Amtrak riders (passenger count, not passenger-miles). The fact that a network of successful passenger trains was available to so many Californians contributed to the success of the high speed rail project at the polls in November, 2008.
3. Buy America We strongly support the development of a robust, domestic rail passenger industry. However, we are gravely concerned that unrealistic administration of Buy America requirements may undermine the Administration’s high speed rail initiative. As we understand it, the Administration plans to enforce a 100% requirement—much stiffer than in FTA and previous Amtrak law—and has indicated there will be no waivers. We have heard that one major railroad may abandon a project for which a grant has been announced because there are no U.S. vendors for certain track and signal materials. We have heard at least two manufacturers of rolling stock say that 100% is not attainable. It is one thing if the problem is that certain items cost less overseas than in the U.S., but quite another if the items literally cannot be U.S.-made unless a new plant is built in the U.S. Eight billion dollars—or $10.5 billion—alone is not going to create a new industry. Likewise, it is not likely to incentivize construction of new plants. In most cases, companies first need to see more certainty about out-year funding. Such future funding, in turn, likely is dependent on our ability to show good results from the grants already awarded. If those grants are stillborn because of unrealistic Buy America enforcement, future funding—already tough to secure due to the condition of the federal budget—will become even less likely. In this scenario, the end result would multiple failures. In the short term, All of these problems would stem from unwillingness to accept a realistic percent of non-American content in an industry which essentially has been non-existent in the U.S. It is one thing if the “no waiver” talk is designed to encourage the highest possible U.S. content. But if it is indeed the Administration’s final position, then the high speed rail program is in serious trouble. —Ross B. Capon, President and CEO .(JavaScript must be enabled to view this email address)
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||
|
||||||||||||||||||||||||
Printable Version